Philokalia (Selections)

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Year of original or translation: 1911

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I. Of the Inspiration of the Divine Scripture

II. That the Divine Scripture is closed up and sealed

III. Why the Inspired Books are Twenty-two in Number

IV. Of the Solecisms and Poor Style of Scripture

V. What is "much speaking," and what are the "many books"? The whole Inspired Scripture is One Book

VI. The whole Divine Scripture is One Instrument of God, perfect and fitted for its Work

VII. Of the special "character" of the Persons of Divine Scripture

VIII That we need not attempt to correct the Solecisms of Scripture, etc

IX. Scripture uses the same Terms in different Significations.

X. Stumbling-blocks in Holy Scripture

XI. On Heretical Interpretation of Holy Scripture

XII. We ought not to despair in reading the Scriptures if we find Difficulties in them

XIII. Philosophy in relation to Holy Scripture

XIV. The Use of Logic in the Study of Scripture

XV. A Reply to the Objection that the Truths of Christianity have been better expressed by the Greeks. Our Lord's Body, etc.

XVI. On the Divisions among Christians

XVII. May we give Heathen Titles to the Supreme God?

XVIII. The "simplicity"of Christian Faith, etc.

XIX. Faith in Christ commendable and accordant with the original Moral Notions of Mankind. How Jesus being God could have a Mortal Body

XX. Man and the Irrational Creatures

XXI. Free Will

XXII. The Dispersion of Mankind, and the Confusion of Tongues

XXIII. Fate, Astrology, etc

XXIV. Matter is not Uncreated, or the Cause of Evil

XXV. God's Foreknowledge, Predestination, etc

XXVI. Scripture Blessings. What things are really "Good" and "Evil"

XXVII. The Hardening of Pharaoh's Heart

CHAP. I. ----Of the inspiration of the Divine Scripture; how it is to be read and understood; why it is obscure; and what is the reason of the obscurity in it, and of what is impossible in some cases, or unreasonable, when it is taken literally. From the work on "Principles" and various other works of Origen.

The following analysis of Origen's scheme of interpretation may be useful to the reader:----

Interpretation | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | Literal (Body) Moral (Soul) Mystical (Spirit) | | ------------------------- ------------------------- | | | | Actual Fictitious Allegory. Anagoge. History. History. Prefiguring the Typifying the Invented by the Holy Spirit history of Christ things of a higher to convey moral and mystical and His Church. world in which truths which earthly things everything of this could not sufficiently typify. earth has its antitype. In the law some things were literally to be observed; others were in the letter impossible or absurd, but were intended to convey moral and mystical teaching.

From the 39th Homily on Jeremiah.

From the Commentary on the 50th Psalm, in the allegorical treatment of the early portion of the history of Uriah.

From the 5th Homily on Leviticus, near the beginning.

CHAP. II. ----That the Divine Scripture is closed up and sealed. From the Commentary on the 1st Psalm.

Then, after topics of a different kind, Origen proceeds:----

Much farther on, comparing the blessings addressed to individuals with those addressed to more than one,132 he says:----

CHAP. III. ---- Why the inspired books are twenty-two 137 in number. From the same volume on the 1st Psalm.

As we are dealing with numbers, and every number has among real existences a certain significance, of which the Creator of the universe made full use as well in the general scheme as in the arrangement of the details, we must give good heed, and with the help of the Scriptures trace their meaning, and the meaning of each of them. Nor must we fail to observe that not without reason the canonical books are twenty-two,138 according to the Hebrew tradition, the same in number as the letters of the Hebrew alphabet. For as the twenty-two letters may be regarded as an introduction to the wisdom and the Divine doctrines given to men in those Characters, so the twenty-two inspired books are an alphabet of the wisdom of God and an introduction to the knowledge of realities. |35

CHAP. IV. ----Of the solecisms and poor style of Scripture. From Volume IV. of the Commentaries on the Gospel according to John, three or four pages from the beginning.

Then, after speaking of the solecisms of the Gospel, he goes on to say:

CHAP. V. ---- What is "much speaking," and what are the "many books"? The whole inspired Scripture is one book. From the Introduction to Volume V. of the Commentaries on John.

I. Since you are not content to have taken up your present work as God's task-master over me,148 and expect me even when away to devote myself mainly to you and to my duty towards you, I in turn, if I decline the labour, and shun the danger to which they are exposed at God's hands who give themselves up to writing on Divine subjects, might find support in Scripture for refusing to "make many books." For Solomon says in Ecclesiastes, "My son, beware of making many books: there is no end: and much study is a weariness of the flesh." 149 If the words |37 before us had not a hidden meaning which we do not even yet clearly understand, we should have expressly broken the commandment through not being on our guard against "making many books."

Then, after saying that he had written four full volumes on a few passages of the Gospel, he proceeds thus:----

Then, after enumerating Prophets and Apostles, and showing how each of them wrote but a little, or not even that, he continues:----

CHAP. VI. ----The whole Divine Scripture is one instrument of God, perfect and fitted for its work. From Volume II. of the Commentaries on the Gospel according to Matthew: "Blessed are the peacemakers" 171

CHAP. VII. ----Of the special character of the persons of Divine Scripture. From the small volume on the Song of Songs, which Origen wrote in his youth.

Again, from the 4th Homily 180 on the Acts, "It was needful that the Scripture should be fulfilled which the Holy Spirit spake before by the mouth of David concerning Judas."

CHAP. VIII. ----That we need not attempt to correct the solecistic phrases of Scripture, and those which are unintelligible according to the letter, seeing that they contain great propriety of thought for those who can understand. From the Commentary on Hosea.

CHAP. IX. ---- Why it is that the Divine Scripture often uses the same term in different significations, even in the same place. From the Epistle to the Romans, Volume IX. on the words, "What then? Is the law sin?" 196

CHAP. X. ----Of things in the Divine Scripture which seem to come near to being a stumbling-block and rock of offence. From the 39th Homily on Jeremiah: "The Lord could not bear because of the evil of your doings"

CHAP. XI. ----That we must seek the nourishment supplied by all inspired Scripture, and not turn from the passages troubled by heretics with ill-advised difficulties, nor slight them; we ought rather to have our share in them without the confusion which attaches to unbelief. From Volume XX. on Ezekiel. "Thus saith the Lord God: Behold I judge between sheep and sheep, as well the rams as the he-goats. Seemeth it a small thing unto you to have fed upon the good pasture, but ye must tread down with your feet the residue of your pasture? and to have drunk of the clear waters, but ye must foul the residue with your feet? And as for my sheep they eat that which ye have trodden with your feet, and they drink that which ye have fouled with your feet? " 217

After giving his views respecting sheep that are rams, and sheep that are goats, and showing that it is the practice of Scripture sometimes to class sheep and goats together, he thus proceeds:----

CHAP. XII. ----That a man ought not to faint in reading the Divine Scripture if he cannot comprehend the dark riddles and parables therein. From the 20th Homily on Joshua, the son of Nun.

CHAP. XIII. ---- When and to whom the lessons of philosophy may be profitable, in the explanation of the sacred Scriptures, with Scripture proof. The letter to Gregory.

CHAP. XIV. ----They who wish to rightly understand the Divine Scriptures must of necessity be acquainted with the logical principles adapted to their use; without these they cannot conceive the exact meaning of the thoughts expressed, as they should do. From Volume III. of the Commentaries on Genesis.

1. "God made the two great lights,232 the greater light for rule 233 of the day, and the lesser light for rule of the night; he made the stars also. And God set them in the firmament of the heaven, to give light upon the earth and to rule 234 the day and the night." We must, then, inquire whether for rule of the day means the same as to rule the day, and for rule of the night the same as to rule the night, in the ordinary acceptation of the words; for Aquila preserved the parallel, making for authority 235 the equivalent of for rule, and to have authority 236 the equivalent of to rule. And we are told by those who carefully investigate the meaning of words, where they deal with the relation of names and predicates, that the things bearing the names previously exist, and that predicates follow the names. Prudence, for example, they say is a name with a predicate, and the predicate is to be prudent. Similarly, moderation is a name, and to be moderate is a predicate; and they say that prudence pre-exists, and that from prudence is derived the predicate to be prudent. We have made these observations, though some may think we are going beyond the intention of Scripture, because God Who made the lights makes the greater for rule of the day and the lesser for rule of the night; but when He places them in the firmament of |61 the heaven it is no longer for rule of the day and of the night, but to rule the day and the night. The orderly and systematic arrangement of the passage, the names coming first and then the predicates, roused our suspicions that the matter was so understood by the servants of God, and all the more because Aquila, who strove to interpret most literally, has only distinguished the name from the predicate.

CHAP. XV. ----A reply to the Greek philosophers who disparage the poverty of style of the Divine Scriptures, and allege that the noble truths of Christianity have been better expressed among the Greeks. They further assert that the body of the Lord was ill-favoured; with the reason of the different forms of the Word. From the treatise against Celsus, who wrote against Christians, Volumes VI. and VII.

Again in Book VI., in reply to the statement of Celsus that our Lord's body was unsightly, Origen writes thus:----

CHAP. XVI. ----Concerning those who slander Christianity on account of the heresies in the Church. Book III. against Celsus.

CHAP. XVII. ----A reply to certain philosophers who say that it makes no difference whether we call Him Who is God over All by the name Zeus, current among the Greeks, or by that which is used by Indians, for instance, or. Egyptians. Books I. and V. against Celsus.

And in Book V., treating of the same subject, he says:

CHAP. XVIII. ----A reply to those Greek philosophers who profess to know everything, and blame the simple faith of the man of Christians; and complain that they prefer folly to wisdom in life; moreover, that no wise or educated |87 man has become a disciple of Jesus; but boatmen and tax-gatherers of the lowest class, they say, get fools and blockheads, slaves, weak women and children, to submit themselves to the Gospel. Books I. and III. against Celsus.

And towards the end of the same book, Book I., respecting the statement that no wise or educated man has been a disciple of Jesus, there is the following:----

12. "What need was there for you while still an infant to be carried off into Egypt, so that you might not have your throat cut? For it was not likely that a god should be afraid of death?" and so on. But inasmuch as we believe Jesus, when He Himself says concerning His Divinity, "I am the way, the truth, and the life," 342 or anything similar; and as we also believe Him when, referring to His having a human body, He says,"But now ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth," 343 we maintain that He was something compound. And inasmuch as it was His purpose during His sojourn on earth to live the life of a man, it was right that He should not unseasonably expose Himself to death. So, too, it was necessary that He should be taken away by His parents who were guided by one of God's angels.

Then Celsus goes on to quote what is said against the teaching of Jesus by a very small number of persons who are considered Christians, not the most intelligent, as he supposes, but the most ignorant, and tells us "that such rules as these are laid down by them: Let no educated person come, no one wise, no one prudent; for education, wisdom, and prudence are with us regarded as bad things. But if any one is unlearned, if any one is without understanding, or uneducated, or a mere child, let him come boldly. Now the fact that they confess these persons to be worthy of their God, shows that they wish and are able to convince none but fools, low-born people, blockheads, slaves, weak women, and children." This is our reply. When Jesus was teaching self-control He said, "Every |99 one that looketh upon a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." 348 Now, suppose a man saw some few persons, out of so many, who are considered to be Christians, living undisciplined lives, he would with very good reason accuse them of living contrary to the teaching of Jesus; but he would be most unreasonable if he were to charge the Gospel with their offence. Just so, if Christian doctrine 349 as much as any other is found to invite men to wisdom, they must be blamed who rest satisfied with their own ignorance, and who say, not what Celsus relates (for though some are ignorant and unlearned, they do not use such shameless language), but other things which, though far less important, are nevertheless calculated to turn believers from the practice of wisdom.

CHAP. XIX. ----And again, earlier in the same book, Origen says, That our faith in our Lord has nothing in common with the irrational superstitious faith of the Gentiles, and that it is both commendable, and accords with the original moral notions of mankind. In answer also to those who say, How do we think that Jesus is God seeing that He had a mortal body?

CHAP. XX. ----A reply to those who say that the whole world, including man, was made not for man, but for the irrational creatures; for the irrational creatures live with less toil than men; further, that they are wiser than we are, and are both dear to God, and have a conception of God, and foreknow the future; wherein we shall also oppose transmigration of souls, and have something to say concerning augury and the trickery connected with it. From Book IV. against Celsus.

"Then the feasts were common, and seats 400 common, To immortal gods and mortal men."

"Behold a wonder! by Olympian Jove

Sent forth to light, a snake, with blood-red back, Of aspect fearful, issuing from beneath

The altars, glided to the plane-tree straight.

There on the topmost bough, beneath the leaves

Cowering, a sparrow's callow nestlings lay; Eight fledglings, and the parent bird the ninth.

All the eight nestlings, uttering piercing cries, The snake devoured; and as the mother flew, Lamenting o'er her offspring, round and round, Uncoiling, caught her, shrieking, by the wing!

Then, when the sparrow's nestlings and herself

The snake had swallowed, by the God, who first

Sent him to light, a miracle was wrought: For Jove, the deep-designing Saturn's son, Turned him to stone; we stood, and wondering gazed."412 |130

Respecting the eagle he says----

"A soaring eagle in his talons bore

A dragon, huge of size, of blood-red line, Alive, and breathing still, nor yet subdued; For, twisting backward, through the breast he pierced

His bearer, near the neck; he, stung with pain, Let fall his prey, which dropped amid the crowd; Then screaming, on the blast was borne away.

The Trojans, shuddering, in their midst beheld

The spotted serpent, dire portent of Jove." 413

Shall we say that the eagle was a divining bird, but that the serpent, though the augurs make use of the creature, had not the gift of divination? The arbitrary distinction is easily refuted, and is not the supposition that both had the gift easily disproved? Would not the serpent, if he had possessed divining power, have taken care that the eagle did not treat him so? One might produce countless other instances to show that the animals have not in themselves a divining soul. But, as the poet says, and most men agree, "Olympian Jove himself sent him to the light"; 414 and if Apollo also uses a hawk as his messenger, something symbolical is intended, for a falcon is said to be Apollo's swift messenger.415

"Would that they might eat their last meal here!" 418

She was "divine": the great Ulysses, the friend of Homer's Athene, was not "divine," but understanding the omens given by the "divine" slave he rejoiced; in the words of the poet, "The noble Ulysses rejoiced at the omen." 419 Again, observe that if the birds really have a Divine soul and perceptions of God, or, as Celsus says, "the gods," when we men sneeze, we sneeze, of course, because we have a certain divinity and divining faculty of soul. For many testify to this; and the poet accordingly says----

"Telemachus sneezed as the prayer was offered." 420

Wherefore, also, Penelope says----

"Do you not see that my son sneezed as you spoke?"

CHAP. XXI. ----Of Free Will, with an explanation and interpretation of those sayings of Scripture which seem to destroy it; such as the following:---- a. "The Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh." b. "I will take away their stony hearts, and will give |138 them hearts of flesh, that they may walk in my statutes and keep mine ordinances." c. "That seeing they may not see, and hearing they may hear and not understand, lest haply they should turn again, and it should be forgiven them." d. "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that hath mercy." e. "It is of God both to will and to do" f."So then he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth."

CHAP. XXII. ---- What is the dispersion on earth of rational, that is, human souls, indicated under a veil in the building of the tower, and the confusion of tongues thereat? Wherein we shall also treat of many lords set over the dispersed according to their condition. From Book v. against Celsus.

2. "And they ought," he says, "to keep their laws not only because different peoples have had different ideas of laws and customs, and because of the necessity of guarding public institutions, but also because it is probable that different parts of the earth were originally assigned to different superintending spirits, and having been made into separate realms are that way administered." So, as if he had forgotten what he said against the Jews, he now gives them a share in the general distribution of praise to all who keep the ancestral usages; for he says, |165 "And, in fact, in the several instances right practice would depend on the pleasure of the ruling spirits." And observe whether he does not distinctly mean, if he can bring it about, to make a Jew live in the observance of Jewish laws and not forsake them, inasmuch as he would be guilty of profanity if he did forsake them; for he says, "It is profanity to relinquish the original local usages." In reply, I should like to ask him and those who agree with him, who it was that originally assigned the different parts of the earth to the different guardian angels,517 in particular, the country of the Jews and its people, to the one or more angels whose charge they were. Did Zeus, as Celsus would say, assign the Jewish people and their country to one or more? And Did Zeus intend that the spirit to whom Judea was allotted should make the existing Jewish laws, or was this done against his will? That Celsus may answer, if he will, you see I am willing to put the whole thing in a nutshell. But if the parts of the earth have not been assigned to their guardian spirits by some one deity, it follows that each at random and with no one to direct him, took his share of the earth just as it happened; but this is absurd, and enough to overthrow belief in the providence of the Supreme God.

CHAP. XXIII. ----Of Fate, and how though God foreknows the conduct of every one, human responsibility remains the same. Further, how the stars 535 are not productive of human affairs, but merely indicate them; further, that men cannot attain to an accurate knowledge of these things, but that the signs are set by Divine powers; what is the cause of the signs. Astrology seems to have some elements of truth. From Book III. of the Commentaries on Genesis, "And let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years."

The same subject is further discussed in Book II. of the treatise against Celsus as follows:----

"Beget not children in defiance of the gods; For if thou shalt beget a son, thy son shall slay thee, And all thy house shall wade through blood." 557

Here it is clearly shown that it was possible for Laius not to beget children, for the oracle would not have commanded him to do what was impossible; but the begetting was possible, and neither alternative was compulsory. And the consequence of his not guarding against begetting children, was that through begetting he suffered what is related in the tragedy concerning Oedipus and Jocasta and their sons. |186

From Book III. of the Commentary on Genesis:----

And Clement of Rome 581 in his argument with his father at Laodicea has some comments on the question before us----the passage occurs in The Travels,582----which agree with the foregoing. Towards the end he speaks with great force on the seeming results of "Nativity," Book X.

I answered, consider with me, father, what the nature of Astrology 583 is, and upon what grounds I give you my advice. If you meet with an astrologer, and begin by telling him that at a certain time you had poor luck, and ask him to be good enough to inform you what star was the cause of it, he will, say that a malignant Mars or Saturn ruled the times, or that one of them was periodic,584 or that one |196 of them regarded the particular year from the point of quadrature, or diametrically,585 or in conjunction, or centrally,586 or was retrograding,587 and no end of things besides. He will tell you that either an auspicious planet was not counteracting 588 a malignant one, or it was not observable, or was in figure,589 or was retrograding, or in eclipse, or in detriment,590 or was among the dim stars. And because there are many ostensible causes, he is still able to adapt his proofs to what he has been told by you. Now, if you afterwards go to another astrologer and tell him the opposite, viz. that at that same time you had a piece of good fortune, and ask him from what star of your nativity it has arisen, though you have deceived him, he is able, as I said before, out of many figures to find one, or two, or three, or more, which he will make out to be the true cause of your good fortune. For it is impossible that at any man's nativity, at any hour, some of the stars should not be favourably placed, others unfavourably; for the circle 591 admits of equal divisions, is diversified in contents, and admits of unlimited shuffling, so that any astrologer can say what he likes. We can sometimes make nothing of ambiguous dreams, but the event enables us to give them the most fitting interpretation. So it is with Astrology. Before the events it can tell us nothing certain, but when the facts are related the result clearly shows the cause. This is why in predicting the future they frequently err, and after the event blame themselves, and say, "It was this or that caused it, and we did not know." As I said yesterday, the reason why the very |197 learned astrologers err is that they do not know what is certainly the cause of a man's nativity, and what is not certainly so, and what things we certainly long to do, and are not certain to do. The cause is clear to us who have learnt the secret, viz. that being free to exercise our faculties of reason we sometimes yield to concupiscence and suffer defeat, sometimes resolve to check it, and succeed. But astrologers, through not being acquainted with this very secret, though they have expatiated on the whole subject of man's Free Will from the first, have fallen into the error of devising climacterics; for they regard our power of choice as a most obscure subject, as we pointed out yesterday. Now it is your turn. If you have anything to say in reply, please say it.

And the father answered with an oath, Nothing can be truer than your words.

CHAP. XXIV. ----Matter is not uncreated, or the cause of evil. From Book VII. of the Praeparatio Evangelica of Eusebius of Palestine.

It seems so to me.

So, then, if matter had no qualities, and the world was made by God, and qualities are in the world, God is the Maker of the qualities.

Just so.

But I think you said before that nothing can possibly come out of nothing. Please tell me, therefore, whether |200 you think that the qualities of the world have not sprung from already existing qualities?

It seems so.

And that these qualities are quite distinct from the substances?

Yes.

Well, then, if God did not make the qualities out of existing qualities, and they have not come from the substances, because they are not substances, we are driven to the conclusion that they were made by God out of nothing. And this is why you seemed to me to urge in vain that we cannot possibly suppose that anything was made by God out of nothing. Let us look at the matter this way. Among ourselves we see men making various things out of nothing; out of nothing I say, though they certainly do seem to be creators in their own departments. Take architects, for example. They do not build cities out of cities, nor, similarly, temples out of temples. If because substances exist which are at their command, you suppose the architects to produce cities and temples out of existing things, you are mistaken, for it is not the substance which makes the city, nor the temples, but the skill in treating the substance. And the skill does not spring from any skill existing in the substances, but from a skill which has no existence in them. You may meet me with the objection that the artist out of the skill which he himself has makes the skill in the substance. It seems to me a fair rejoinder that the man's skill does not arise from any previously existing skill. It cannot be that skill as a self-existent entity gives the skill; for it belongs to the class of accidents, and to those things which receive a real existence when they inhere in substance. You may have the man without the architect's skill, but you cannot have the architect's skill unless the man first exist; and we must therefore maintain that the various forms of human skill have nothing out of which they arise.594 Now, if we have shown that this |201 is so with men, must we not much rather admit that God can make not only qualities out of nothing, but also substances? For if it is proved that anything arises out of nothing, it is also proved that the same holds good of substances.

I think it is right to say, qualities of substances.

But matter, you thought, was unqualified and unformed?

So I assumed when we began the discussion.

Well, then, if evil is a quality of matter, and matter was unqualified, and you affirm that God is the Maker of the qualities, it follows that God will also be the Creator of evil. Since, then, we cannot even thus avoid making God the cause of evil, it seems to me superfluous to make Him inseparable from matter. If you have any answer to this, pray say on. If we were disputing for victory, I should think the question of evil decided; but as we are making the inquiry more in a friendly spirit and to do one another good, I think we may re-open the discussion.

My aim and object must, I think, be very obvious, and you must be conscious how earnestly I desire in arguing not to score a victory on the strength of plausible lies, but by careful inquiry to point out the truth. And I am quite sure that you are so disposed. So please, therefore, without hesitation use such means as you consider best for the discovery of the truth, for by so doing you will profit not yourself only but me also, by showing me my ignorance. It seems clear to me that evil has a substantial existence, for I never see what is evil apart from substances.

I think so.

And the bodily compound is self-existent, needing nothing to give it existence? |202

Just so.

And do you think that evil things are a man's actions?

It appears so to me.

And the actions then only begin when the agent is present?

Of course.

And if there is no one to act, there are no actions?

There cannot be any.

Well, then, if substance is a kind of bodily compound, and the bodily compound needs nothing to give it existence: and if evil things are a man's actions, and the actions require some one to act, and when he acts they then begin to be, it follows that evil things are not substances. But if evil things are substances, and murder is an evil, murder will be a substance; murder, however, is a man's action; murder will therefore not be a substance. If you mean that the things in action are substances, I agree; as, for example, the murderer, inasmuch as he is a man, is a substance; but the murder which he commits is not a substance, but something, done by the substance. Now we say that a man is sometimes bad because he commits murder, and sometimes, on the contrary, we call him good because of his well-doing; and these names are accidentally associated with the substance, though the accidents are not the substance itself. For neither is murder a substance, nor adultery, nor is any such like evil thing. But as the grammarian is so called from grammar, and the rhetorician from rhetoric, and the medical man from medicine, though neither medicine nor rhetoric nor grammar is a substance, and the substance takes its title according to its accidents, neither of which it is; in the same way, it appears to me, the substance receives a name from what are considered evil things, though it is neither one nor the other of them. Consider further, that if you imagine some other deity to be the cause of the evil which men do, he too, inasmuch as he acts in men, is evil because of the evil which he does. For the reason why he too is said to be evil, is that he is |203 an author of evil; and what a man does, is not the man himself, but his actions, and it is from these the title "evil" is derived. If we were to say that a man is what he creates, and he creates murders, and adulteries, and thefts, and all sorts of such things, he will be all these. But if he is all these, and they exist only when they are being done, and have no existence when they are not being done, and if they are done by men, men will be the creators of them, and the causes of their existing or not existing. If you admit that these evil things are the man's actions, it is what from what he does that he has the quality of evil, not from what he is as a substance. For we said that he is called evil from the accidents of the substance, which accidents are not the substance itself, as the medical man is so-called from medicine. And if every man is evil through his actions, and his actions have a beginning, he himself began to be evil, and these evil things, too, had a beginning. If this be so, the man was not evil when his wickedness began, nor can the evil attaching to him be unoriginate; we say it did originate with him.

I am delighted with your ready acquiescence, my friend, and commend your earnestness in the discussion: for every one who is desirous to learn ought not to give a mere |204 random assent to what is said, but should carefully weigh the arguments. For supposing one of two disputants to take up a false position, and thus lead his opponent to the conclusion he desires, that will not convince the man who hears him; but if there seems to be a good opening for a remark, the latter will make it on the spot; for one of two things will happen: he will either after hearing what has been said be absolutely benefited by his impressions, or he will convict his antagonist of not speaking the truth. And in my opinion you are not right in saying that matter was qualified from all eternity. For if this be so, what is there for God to create? If we say substances, we have admitted that they already existed; if, on the contrary, we say qualities, we have recognised their pre-existence also. So, then, if both substances and qualities are already in existence, it seems to me useless to call God a Creator. But that I may not seem to argue all on my own side, let me ask you a question: In what sense do you say that God was a "Creator"? 595 Is it that He changed the substances so that they no longer were what they were before, but became something different? Or is it that He kept the substances as they previously were, but changed their qualities?

Well, then, since you say that a change of the qualities was brought about by God, I wish you would briefly tell |205 me whether you likewise think that things evil are qualities of the substances?

I think so.

And were these qualities themselves in matter from the very first, or had they a beginning?

I say that these qualities were eternally co-existent with matter.

But do you not say that God produced a change of the qualities?

Yes. That is what I say.

Was it for the better, or for the worse?

I think I must admit it was for the better.

Well, then, if the evil things are qualities of matter, and God changed its qualities for the better, we are bound to inquire into the origin of evil. For the qualities did not remain what they were by nature. If the qualities were not bad at first, and you say that through the change which God made, matter acquired its first bad qualities, God will be the cause of evil, because He changed qualities which were not bad, so that they became bad; or do you suppose God not to have changed the bad qualities into better ones, but that the only ones left, the indifferent ones, were changed by God for the sake of putting all in order?

That has been my view from the first.

That is my opinion.

But water is the opposite of fire?

Certainly.

And, likewise, darkness is the opposite of light, and heat of cold? And moisture of drought?

Just so.

Well, now, if nothing opposes itself, and the things I have mentioned are opposed to one another, it follows that they are not one and the same matter, nor made of one and the same matter. And I wish to ask you a question like the others: Do you admit that the parts of a thing are not destructive of one another?

I do.

And that fire and water, and the others I mentioned, are parts of matter?

Just so.

And do you not also agree that water is destructive of fire, light of darkness, and so on with all similar things?

Yes.

If, then, the parts of a thing are not destructive of one another, and these things are destructive of one another, it follows that they are not parts of one another; and if they |208 are not parts of one another, they will not be parts of one and the same matter. But in fact they will not be matter at all, because that nothing is destructive of itself, as is the case with opposites. For nothing is opposed to itself, opposites being by nature opposed to things other than themselves; as for example, white is not the opposite of white, but is said to be opposed to black; light, too, is shown not to be opposed to itself, but to darkness, and similarly with countless other things. So then, if matter is a single substance, it cannot be its own opposite; and if this doctrine of opposites holds good, it appears that there is no such matter.

The foregoing is taken from Book VII. of the Praeparatio Evangelica of Eusebius; being, as he says, the work of Maximus,598 a Christian writer of some distinction. But it has been discovered word for word in Origen's discussion with the Marcionites and other heretics, Eutropius defending, Megethius opposing.

CHAP. XXV. ----That the "separation" which arises from foreknowledge does not do away with Free Will. From Book I. of the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, at the words "separated unto the gospel of God."

CHAP. XXVI. ----Of the question of things "good"and "evil"; that they partly depend on our own efforts 620 and partly do not; and (that) according to the teaching of Christ, but not as Aristotle thinks. From the treatise on the 4th Psalm, at the words, "Many say, who will show us the good things?" 621

CHAP. XXVII. ----The meaning of the Lord's hardening Pharaoh's heart.

Origen elsewhere discusses the same subject----

Elsewhere in the same Commentaries on Exodus----

And elsewhere----

And again----

12. "And thou shalt say unto Pharaoh, Israel is my son, my first-born: and I have said unto thee, Let my son go, that he may serve me; and if thou refusest to let him go: behold, I will slay thy son, thy first-born." 700 Let me ask those persons who allege that this is the action of a just God, and suppose, according to the literal meaning of the words, that Pharaoh's heart was hardened, how He Who hardened the heart of Pharaoh that he might not let the people go, can be just, and at the same time threaten that unless Pharaoh will let them go, He will slay his first-born son? Being hard pressed they will confess that He must be a bad God. Then, again, they will be upset by other passages and forced to escape from their bondage to the letter, inasmuch as the literal meaning, according to them, is inconsistent, with the justice of the Creator.701 And once they are compelled to investigate the matter, they will proceed so far that they will no longer accuse the Creator, but will allow that He is good. Let us then ask those who think they understand the words, "The Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh," 702 whether they believe the above threats were uttered by God through the mouth of Moses inspired for the occasion, or whether there was no truth in them? If there was no truth in them, God according to them is neither just nor true, and on their own showing is not God at all; but if the words were truly spoken, I would have them consider whether God does not blame Pharaoh as a free agent when He says, "If thou wilt not let my people go";703 and in another place, "How long wilt thou refuse to humble thyself before me?"704 For the question, "How long wilt thou refuse to humble thyself before me?" 704 is intended to shame Pharaoh, because, if he did not humble himself, it was not that he could not, but that he would not. And then there is what was said before by Moses to Pharaoh: "That thou mayest know that the earth is the Lord's. |237 But as for thee and thy servants, I know that ye have not yet feared the Lord." 705 This shows that they will fear----a good argument against the heterodox, for it proves the goodness of God, and disproves their tenet of a man's being naturally doomed to perdition.

And in Book II. of the Commentaries on the "Song of Songs "----